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I\'

COMES NOW, Petitioner/Plaintiff, ACI NORTH\VEST, INC., an Idaho corporation
(hereinafter "ACI") by and through its attorneys, L\MES, VER.NON & \VEEKS, PA, and
hereby presents Appellant's Brief.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This case arises from a Kootenai County development called Monument Heights. The
developer, Monument Heights, LLC, failed to fully pay ACI for materials and services ACI
supplied to the LLC for the development on a mountainside, south of Post Falls, Idaho. ACI
filed and recorded mechanic's and materialman's liens. Monument Heights, LLC, subsequent to
ACI's commencement of construction, borrowed sums from private lenders Dan S. Jacobsen,
Sage Holdings, LLC, Steven G. Lazar, the Mitchell A. Martin and Karen C. Martin Family Trust
Dated August 9, 2005, Devon Chapman, and HLT Real Estate, LLC (collectively referred to as
"Jacobsen"). Jacobsen did not obtain release of lien rights from ACI at the date of the loan and
recording of the security documents. Monument Heights, LLC sold portions of the property
before and after ACI began construction. Portions of sold property were benefited by ACI' s
materials and services. ACI sought lien foreclosure, and this appeal arises from the district
court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment which relied on ParkWest Homes, LLC v.

Barnson, 294 P.3d 1125 (Idaho 2013) (superseded and replaced at 154 Idaho 678,302 P.3d 18
(2013)).
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW:
On August 10, 2009, ACI (Plaintiff in CV-2009-6398) timely initiated the judicial
foreclosure of its Claim of Lien.
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On June 4, 2010, the Honorable Lansing Haynes stayed the subject trustee's sale.
On July 30, 2010, CV-2009-6398 was consolidated into this case. R. page 6.
On January 12, 2012, ACI filed an Amended Complaint in this action seeking to
judicially foreclose its mechanic's liens. R. page 28.
On April 5, 2013, the district court granted Jacobsen's and Monument Heights, LLC's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against ACI holding that ACI's liens were lost and
unenforceable as to the unnamed trustees of the deeds of trust. R. pages 117-127.
On April 23, 2013, Jacobsen and Monument Heights, LLC filed the Motion to Vacate
Stay of the Trustee's Sale ordered June 4, 2010. On May 14, 2013, oral argument was heard on
Jacobsen and Monument Heights, LLC's motion and the motion was granted. R. page 39.
On May 17, 2013, ACI's Motion for a Rule 54(b) Certificate was granted. R. pages 40,
212-14.
On June 7, 2013, ACI filed its Notice of Appeal of the April 5, 2013, order granting
Jacobsen and Monument Heights, LLC's Partial Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R.
pages 40, 227-34.
On June 13, 2013, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Oder Granting
Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of the Trustee's Sale.
C.

CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS:

This case involves a development known as Monument Heights on Blossom Mountain in
Kootenai County. The developer, Monument Heights, LLC, planned to develop prestige acreage
lots across the Spokane River and up the mountainside from the City of Post Falls. Monument
Heights was expected to have expansive views to the north, including the City of Post Falls and
most of the Rathdrum Prairie and the mountains beyond.
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Daniel D. Harris and Jody L. Harris bought property adjacent to the Monument Heights
development from Monument Heights, LLC. The roadway which is the subject of this litigation
services the Harris property in addition to the Monument Heights development. Mr. and Mrs.
Harris are not involved in this appeal.
On May 27, 2008, ACI commenced furnishing materials and services in the construction
of a roadway and other improvements. The building of the road became a far more arduous task
than originally anticipated. Blasting, substantial hauling and heavy equipment work was
necessary due to a rock outcropping on a parcel. ACI was the general contractor for the project;
however, Monument Heights, LLC hired a separate blasting contractor, Keith A. Sims, dba
Kasco of Idaho, LLC ("Kasco"). Kasco is a party to the lower court litigation but not a party to
this appeal.
The development faced challenges. The project was started late in the economic cycle
and Monument Heights, LLC was inadequately capitalized for the difficulties that arose.
Monument Heights, LLC also faced high financing expenses since it was forced to borrow from
private lenders.
On August 1, 2008, over a month after construction had been commenced by ACL
Monument Heights, LLC executed and delivered the Jacobsen loan documents. The Deed of
Trust was subsequently recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder on August 6, 2008 as
Instrument 2172582000 ("Monument Heights Deed of Trust"). R. pages 66- 70.
On January 29, 2009, following Monument Heights, LLC's failure to stay current with
payments to ACI, ACI caused a mechanic's lien to be recorded with the Kootenai County
Recorder as Instrument No. 2194504000. R. pages 166-68.
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On July 28, 2009, ACI recorded an Endorsement to Claim of Lien for Payment on
Account, as Instrument No. 2224601000. The Endorsement stated that a payment on account
was received from Monument Heights, LLC on February 1 L 2009, in the amount of $25,000.00.
R. pages 170-71.
On August 10, 2009, ACI initiated these proceedings, CV-2009-6398, seeking judicial
foreclosure of its Claim of Lien. On June 4, 2010, the Honorable Lansing Haynes stayed the
subject trustee's sale.
On January 20, 2010, Charles R. Dean, Jr. was appointed as the Successor Trustee under
the Monument Heights Deed of Trust. At all times since that date, Mr. Dean has remained the
Trustee. R. pages 80-82.
On or about March 11, 2011, Monument Heights, LLC sold a portion of the real property
subject to the ACI lien, the original house and surrounding acreage, to Defendants Anthony L.
St. Louis and Andrea J. Stephens. Anthony L. St. Louis and Andrea J. Stephens did not borrow
the funds to purchase from a traditional lender. Instead, after making a down payment they
borrowed the balance from Monument Heights, LLC. Anthony St. Louis and Andrea Stephens
executed and delivered to Monument Heights, LLC a Deed of Trust ("St. Louis/Stephens Deed
of Trust"). Pioneer Title Company of Kootenai County, Inc. was appointed the Trustee under the
St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust. At all times since that date, Pioneer Title Company has
remained the Trustee. Anthony L. St. Louis and A,.ndrea J. Stephens are not involved in this
appeal. R. pages 59-62,
On March 15, 2011, Monument Heights, LLC sold the St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust
and note to Lilly Properties, Inc. ("Lilly"), a Nevada corporation, as evidenced by an Assignment
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of Secured Note & Deed of Trust recorded as Instrument 2306230000. Lilly is not involved in
this appeal. R. pages 75-77.
ACI, in accordance with two separately issued litigation guarantees, has never named the
Trustee on the deeds of trust in the judicial foreclosure of the mechanic liens.
On June 14, 2011, ACI, at the request of Monument Heights, LLC, re-commenced
furnishing materials and services for the development. ACI invoiced Monument Heights, LLC
the sum of $47,658.65 for this additional work. R. page 177.
On July 26, 2011, ACI recorded a second mechanic's lien with the Kootenai County
Recorder as Instrument No. 2321390000 securing the principal sum of $462,780.46, for the total
unpaid balance for all of ACI's materials and service since commencing work on May 27, 2008.
R. pages 177-87.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Should ParkWest Homes, L.L.C v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678,302 P.3d 18 (2013),
Be Modified or Reversed?
2. Did the district court err in requiring that a trustee be named in a lien or in a suit to
foreclose a lien under the Trust Deed statute, LC.§ 45-1502, et seq.?
3. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment based upon ParkWest Homes,
L.L.C. v. Barnson, 294 P.3d 1125, (Idaho 2013), in that the facts of that case are
distinguishable from the facts of the present case?
4.

Did the district court err in failing to construe the Idaho lien statutes, I.C. § 45-501,
et seq., liberally in favor of the lien holder because the lien holder substantially
complied, in good faith, with the statutory requirements for a mechanic's lien?

5. Does the district court's ruling require clarification as to whether its outcome is 1)
that ACI's lien is lost and unenforceable solely against the interest held by the trustee
of the deed of trust, or 2) that the deed of trust is superior in priority to ACI's
mechanics lien?
6. Is application of the Park West holding to this case (the idea that a subsequent transfer
of the property pursuant to the trust instrument will result in the transferee taking the
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property free and clear of ACI's lien) at odds with general rules of trust law and Idaho
Statute because ACI's Mechanics Lien is Superior to the Deeds of Trust as
Instruments?
7. Should ACI be awarded its attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to l.C. § 12-120(3)
providing for attorney's fees in commercial transactions and LC.§ 45-513 providing
for attorney's fees in an action on a mechanic's or materialman's lien?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court set forth the standard of review in Park West Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 154
Idaho 678, 302 P.3d 18 (2013), as follows:

An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard a district
court uses when granting a motion for summary judgment. A & J Const. Co., Inc.
v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). Under Rule 56(c) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." If the evidence reveals no disputed
issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Smith v.
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718-19, 918 P.2d 583, 587-88
(1996). In making this determination, "all disputed facts are liberally construed in
favor of the non-moving party." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d
360, 364 (1991 ). Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material
fact. Id. Inferences that can reasonably be made from the record are made in favor
of the non-moving party. Id. However, the non-moving party may not rest on a
mere scintilla of evidence. Id If the record raises neither a question of witness
credibility nor requires weighing the evidence, then summary judgment should be
granted. Merrill v. Dujjy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410, 414, 353 P.2d 657, 659
(1960). "The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party
fails to make a shov,ing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case .... " Bade!! v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d
126, 127 (1988).
Id, 154 Idaho at 682,302 P.3d at 22.
ARGUMENT

A.

Park West Homes, L.L.C. v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678,302 P.3d 18 (2013),
Should be Modified or Reversed.

Idaho case law describing the nature of a deed of trust is not in line with the practical
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6

reality of what the Idaho real estate bar, lending industry, construction industry and the title
industry use every day as a security instrument on a vast majority of all real estate loans. Cases
including ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson have created confusion and uncertainty and are
leading toward expensive and unexpected results of increasing litigation and endangering the use
of deeds of trust.
ACI encourages the Court to use this opportunity to clarify what is conveyed to a trustee
in a deed of trust. The need for clarification flows from the analyses of the trustee's "legal title"
and the "power of sale" in the cases of Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P2d 1048 (1983),
and Defendant A. v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 978 P.2d 222 (1999), which led to this
Court's recent decision in ParkWest Homes. LL. C v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678, 302 P.3d 18
(Idaho 2013 ).

1.

What is the Nature of a Deed of Trust?

Part of the confusion surrounding a deed of trust emanates from its name. The name of
the document as a "deed of trust" or "trust deed" makes little sense given its statutory purpose
and usage. One California court stated: "Just as a panda is not a true bear, a trustee of a deed of
trust is not a true trustee." Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis, 196 Cal.App.3d 948,955,
242 Cal.Rptr. 251) (1987).
The reality is that a "deed" of "trust" is not a deed in the sense of a warranty or quitclaim
deed and is not a trust document in the sense of a trust corpus managed and held by a trustee for
the benefit of the beneficiary. Instead, it is a statutory creation adopted at the behest of the
lending industry to avoid a cumbersome foreclosure process. See Roos v. Belcher, 79 Idaho 473,
477,321 P.2d 210,211 (1958) (discussing the lack of foreclosure requirement for deeds of trust).
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In Long v. Williams, l 05 Idaho 585, 671 P .2d 1048 (1983), a debtor in bankruptcy argued
that the execution of a deed of trust encumbering his real property divested him of the title to the
real property wh

justified excluding the encumbered real property from the bankruptcy estate~

The Supreme Court disagreed:
[T]he deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of sale,
capable of exercise upon the occurrence of certain contingencies (such as default
in payment) and leaves in the trustor a legal estate comprised of all incidents of
o\vnership which passes to the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of bankruptcy.
Id at 586,671 P.2d at 1049. The Court further described the trustee's interest under a deed of

trust as "for practical purposes, only a mortgage with power of sale." Id at 588, 671 P.2d at
1051.
The Court relied on Bank of Ita(y Nat. Trust & Sar. Ass'n v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 644,654,
20 P.2d 940, 944 (1933), for the notion that a trust deed is like a mortgage with a power of sale.
This California case is the bulwark for the holding that a deed of trust trustee cannot "hold a
mere 'lien' on the property" because the deed of trust is a "mortgage with power of sale." Id at
656, 20 P.2d at 944. The California Court relies on a California statute to conclude that the legal
title conveyed is nothing more than a security interest. Id. The California court goes to great
effort to limit the scope of the conveyance to assure that the grantor/trustor in the deed of trust
"is treated by our law as the holder of the legal title,'' with "a right of possession" and has a
"valid claim of homestead.'' Id. at 656-657, 20 P.2d at 940.
One case relied on by the California court is an Idaho case. "In Idaho, a state that has
adopted nearly all of our Code sections on security transactions, it has been held that a deed of
trust is a mortgage with pov.1er o_f sale." Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Bentley, 217
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Cal. at 654, 20 P.2d 940 (citing Brown v. Bryan, 5 Idaho 145, 51 P. 995 (1896)) (emphasis
added).
In 1896 the Idaho Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Bryan, 5 Idaho 145, 51 P. 995 (1896)
that
[a] trust deed executed to secure a given debt, payable at a specified time, upon
real estate, is, under the statutes of Idaho a mortgage, and cannot be foreclosed by
notice and sale, under a power of sale in such trust deed; and such trust deed can
only be foreclosed by judicial sale, pursuant to decree rendered in an action
brought therefor in the proper court.

Id. (emphasis added).
The Bank of Italy v. Bentley court's reliance on Brown v. Bryan for the proposition that a
deed of trust is a mortgage with a power of sale is misplaced because Broivn v. Bryan held that a
deed of trust required judicial foreclosure. The Idaho Trust Deed Act would not be enacted for
another sixty years following Brown v. Bryan. It is unfortunate that the Idaho Supreme Court
relied exclusively on Bank of Italy v. Bentley for its decision in Long, especially considering that
Bank of Italy misconstrued Idaho law.

In 1989, the Court noted that the enactment of the Idaho Trust Deed Act effectively
overruled Brown v. Bryan. Frazier v. Neilsen & Co., 115 Idaho 739, 741, 769 P.2d 1111, 1113
(1989), observing:
At the end of the last century, this Court refused to enforce a power of sale clause,
holding that an instrument termed as a deed of trust must be treated as a mortgage
under the then-existing statutes. , , ,
The case of Bro-wn v. B1yan, is distinguishable. The then-existing
legislative enactments did not include the Idaho Trust Deeds Act, LC.§§ 45-1502
et seq. This act sets forth in detail the procedures which must be followed in
foreclosures of deeds of trust, and effectively overruled Brown v. B1yan. \ilhen
the legislature first enacted these laws in 1957, and in its subsequent amendments,
it made the act applicable only to deeds of trust. Because the legislature has
created a separate scheme for deeds of trust, the rationale for Brown v. Bryan,
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that mortgages and deeds of trust are functional equivalents, is undercut. The
legislature obviously intended separate treatment: therefore, they are not
functionally the same.

Id. at 740-41, 769 P.2d at 1112-13 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Long that "even though title passes for the purpose
of the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage with a power of sale," 105
Idaho at 587-88, 671 P.2d at 1050-51, is incorrect. This holding mischaracterizes the nature of a
deed of trust and misled this Court in the ParkWest case. The Court in Frazier, six years later,
put to rest the misguided notion that a trust deed and a mortgage are functionally the same;
however, this Court persisted in later cases in likening a trust deed to a mortgage with a power of
sale.
A statutory deed of trust is not a "mortgage" and shares few characteristics with a
mortgage. \Vhile both act to secure an obligation, usually a promissory note, ,vi.th real estate, a
mortgage is a two-party agreement, and a deed of trust is a three-party agreement. A mortgage
must be foreclosed by judicial action. I. C. § 6-101. A deed of trust is foreclosed through a nonjudicial sale unless the beneficiary chooses to foreclose as a mortgage. LC. § 45-1506. A
mortgage has an equitable right of redemption. I. C. § 11-402. A deed of trust has no such
redemption right. I.C. § 45-1508. A mortgage can be placed on any real property. I.C. § 451001. A deed of trust is statutorily limited to certain properties based upon size and location.
I.C. § 45-1502(5). A mortgage on real property is a lien. I.C. §§ 45-901, -903, and -906. A trust
deed conveys "legal title" to the Trustee. I.C. § 45-1502(3). In Idaho, the phrase "a deed of trust
is a mortgage with a power of sale" misconstrues the law and its simplicity leads to confusion
and erroneous decisions.
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Defendant A. v. Idaho State Bar, I 32 Idaho 662, 978 P.2d 222, (1999), continues the

confusion engendered by Long v. Williams. In Defendant A., an attorney tried to leverage one
client to pay the bill of another client by refusing to deliver an original deed of trnst in his
possession to the first client. Id at 664, P.2d at 224. Defendant A had little to do with the deed
of trnst and could have involved any property wTongfully withheld by the attorney. Instead of
limiting the scope of Defendant A. to wrongful withholding and attorney misconduct, the
Supreme Court in dictum launched into an analysis of deeds of trnsts as "deeds," and then as
"trnsts," and finally as "mortgages with the power of sale," perhaps to support the idea that the
attorney was wrongfully withholding something of value to the first client. Id.
In Defendant A., the Court does cite to the Trnst Deed Statute: LC.§§ 45-1513, 45-1202,
and 45-1203 concerning the delivery of the deed and notes correctly that, "[a] deed oftrnst is a
conveyance of real property. I.C. § 45-1513." Id at 664,978 P.2d at 224. However, the Court
then described a deed of trnst as the functional equivalent of a deed, citing to state law which has
nothing to do with deeds of trust created under the Trust Deed statute. Id at 664-665, 978 P.2d
at 224-225. The Court unnecessarily analogized the Trust Deed to different types of documents
overlooking its description in Long v. FVilliams, 105 Idaho 585, 586, 671 P2d 1048, 1049 (1983),
that a "deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of sale, capable of exercise
upon the occurrence of certain contingencies."
This Court in ParkWest depa:ris from this minimal conveyance characterization in Long v.
Williams and relies instead--erroneously as set forth above--on the language from Long

equating a deed of trust with a mortgage:
Idaho is a title theory state, whereby a deed of trust is a title-passing
procedure. This Court extensively discussed this procedure in Long v. Williams.
105 Idaho 585,587,671 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1983). We noted that a deed of trust is
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effectively a mortgage with a power of sale, but as security for that mortgage,
legal title passes to the trustee. Id. at 587-88, 671 P.2d at 1050-51. When a deed
of trust is executed and delivered, the legal title of the property passes to the
trustee. I.C. § 45-1502(4); Defendant A. v. Idaho State Bar.132 Idaho 662,665,
978 P.2d 222,225 (1999).
ParkWest, 154 ldaho at 684,302 P.3d at 24.
Not only is a deed of trust not a mortgage with a power of sale, this Court did not
describe the nature or extent of the legal title that passes to the trustee of a deed of trust, but
proceeded as if the trustee under the trust deed is the holder of substantial rights and incidents of
ownership. In Long, however the Court described the nature of the trustor's and the trustee's
title under a deed of trust: "[T]he deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power
of sale ... and leaves in the trustor a legal estate comprised of all incidents of ownership .... "
Long, 105 Idaho at 586,671 P.2d at 1049 (emphasis added).

The practical aspects of a deed of trust are well knmvn in the real estate, title and lending
industries. A deed of trust contains a grantor, a beneficiary and a trustee, so the concept of
delivery of a document with only a grantor and grantee is very different from a three party
security instrument. For example, the deed of trust is usually signed by the "grantor" (or
"trustor") and recorded and then is usually "delivered" to someone other than the "grantee" (or
"trustee"). The deed of trust may be delivered to any number oflocations but usually to the
beneficiary or purchaser for securitization. The trustee has little or no function-and certainly
no duties-until and unless there is a default. Even then, the beneficiary often effects a
substitution of trustee. The trustee may resign at any time. The trustee may not be aware of
being named as a trustee. Statutorily, the trustee has no duty or right to manage the property and
no right to sell the property until there is a default and statutory notice requirements have been
met.
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Despite legal title passing to the trustee, to say a deed of trust is a "deed" is incorrect
because as a security device, a deed of trust is not the functional equivalent of a deed in modern
real estate transactions. The statue implies that a deed of trust may be valttl without a receiver of
the conveyance "[i]fa trustee is not appointed in the deed of trust." LC.§ 45-1504(2). Thus, the
Court's analogizing a deed of trust to a deed in Defendant A. makes little sense. That statute says
a deed of trust is a conveyance of real property, but it is a conveyance of nothing more than the
right to act as an auctioneer, which may be a stick in the bundle of property rights; however, it is
a stick that can be taken away at any time by the beneficiary. The "conveyance" described in the
statute is a service to the beneficiary, not the enjoyment of real property rights by the trustee.

2.

What is the Nature of the Trust Deed Trustee's "Legal Title?"

In the Trust Deed Statute, the words "convey"' and "reconvey" refer only to the power of
sale in the event of default and the termination of the security device when the obligation is paid
in full. The deed of trust conveys "title" to the trustee only so far as may be necessary for the
execution of the trustee's duties. A trustee only has two duties with respect to the property: to
sell the property in the event of a default in the obligation and to reconvey its interest in the
property when the debt secured by the deed of trust is satisfied.

If a deed of trust trustee is going to be considered a true O\Vner of the legal title to the
property, then the trustee will be an indispensible party to all real property litigation including
easement, landlord/ tenant, probate, subdivision, water rights and a myriad of other real estate
litigation. It could also open the flood gates to a new form of litigation concerning breach of the
trustee's duties.
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In Idaho, the trustee on a deed of trust is not a typical party in real property litigation
unless the litigation involves a trustee's sale or reconveyance. For example, if neighboring
property owners whose properties are encumbered by a deed of trust have a boundary dispute;
neither the trustees nor the beneficiaries under the deeds of trust are included as parties. By
contrast, if one of the property owners is a trust, the trustee of the trust would be the proper party
to the litigation. The "legal title" held by this kind of trustee is much more comprehensive than
the legal title held by the trustee under a deed of trust. Not including deed of trust trustees in real
property litigation seems to have served the courts and the trustees well and does not appear to
be inconsistent with the spirit and the wording of the trust deed statute. To change this practice
greatly increases cost and risks to the trustee. Several potential results of including deed of trust
trustees in real property litigation include: ( 1) the costs of a deed of trust will increase
dramatically, (2) people and entities will decline to serve as trustees, and (3) the trustees will
become targets for breaching duties as the legal owner.
A deed of trust is not a deed and is not a trust document: it is a statutorily created security
device that does not fit neatly in the common law property distinctions largely because its
purpose is to avoid the application of common law and the protection of debtors afforded at
common law. Idaho Code 45-1502(3) speaks to "conveying real property" but also says that the
conveyance is "in trust to secure the performance of an obligation." Idaho Code 45-1502(4)
defines "Trustee" as the person "to whom the legal title is conveyed by the deed of trust." Legal
title is never defined. The reality is that the "legal title" is solely the right to sell in the event of
foreclosure.
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3.

Park West Incorrectly Expands the Nature of a Trustee's Legal Title.

The limited position of the trustee as the beneficiary's auctioneer should not make the
trustee a necessary party under LC. § 45-510. Section 45-510 does not identify necessary parties
to the foreclosure action; however, the Court has held that if the "lienor fails to timely name a
party-in-interest to the property in an action to enforce its lien, the lienor loses its lien with
respect to the unnamed party's interest in the property." Hilary M. Saltman, Inspecting a Faulty

Foundation in ParkWest Homes v. Bamson, The Advocate, Nov./Dec. 2013, at 29 (citing Willes
v. Palmer, 78 ldaho 104,109,298 P.2d 972,975 (1956)). The question becomes whether the
trustee under a deed of trust is a party-in-interest who requires notice of the lien foreclosure
proceeding. Given the extremely limited nature of this kind of trustee's "legal title," it seems
that no purpose would be served by including the trustee in the lien foreclosure litigation. While
notice in real property transactions and litigation is a consideration, a mechanic's or
materialman' s lien must be recorded. The recording gives notice to anyone concerned with the
real property of the lien's existence. Including or not including the trustee of the deed of trust in
the lien foreclosure action does not change that.
This Court in ParkWest, however, "seems to assert that the trustee holds unqualified title
to the property conveyed under a deed of trust." Soltman, supra. Further, the Court gave no
weight to the language in Long that the trust deed trustee "held nothing more than the power of
sale upon certain contingencies" while the grantor's interest "comprised of all other attributes of
ownership" passed to the banJ,,..ruptcy trustee. Soltman, supra (citing Long, 105 Idaho at 588, 671
P.2d at 1051).
As mentioned above, the Court's expansive view of the nature of the trustee's legal title
raises many quandaries. As stated by Ms. Saltman:
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Perhaps the most troublesome implication of ParkWest II is its potential to
complicate or impede real estate transactions. If a trustee is the legal title holder
of the property, how should we approach any encumbrances junior to a deed of
trust? Would the trustee need to consent to any junior encumbrances? Would the
trustee need to be included in land use applications, as a signatory on plats, or
involved in development agreements, easements, or any other documents
requiring an owner's consent or execution? From the trustee's perspective, if a
trustee must now consent to any of the documents, what duties would the trustee
have to each of the parties to these transactions?
Soltman, supra at 31.
ACI respectfully contends that the Court should revisit ParkWest and should modify or
overrule it.

B.

The District Court Erred in Requiring That a Trustee be Named in a Lien or
in a Suit to Foreclose a Lien Because a "Trustee" Under the Trust Deed
Statute, I.C. § 45-1502, et seq., Holds Such a Minimal Legal Title That a
Trustee Need Not be Named in a Lien or in a Suit to Foreclose a Lien.

The district court erred in requiring that a trust deed trustee be named in a mechanic's
lien foreclosure because a trustee has extremely limited power under a deed of trust. A trust
deed is defined as "a deed executed in conformity with this act and conveying real property to a
trustee in trust to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor or other person named in
the deed to a beneficiary." LC.§ 45-1502(2) (emphasis added). A trustee is defined as a "person
to whom legal title to real property is conveyed by trust deed, or his successor in interest." Id. at
(4). However, the "legal title" held by the trustee is extremely limited. Indeed, a deed of trust
"conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of sale, capable of exercise upon the
occurrence of certain contingencies (such as default in payment) and leaves in the trustor a legal
estate comprised of all incidents of ownership." Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 586, 671 P.2d
1048, 1049 (1983). The title held by the trustor is more significant than that held by the trustee,
so requiring the trustee to be named in a material man's lien is unnecessary. For instance, a
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trustor who has filed bankruptcy still has enough legal interest in property encumbered by a deed
of trust to require him to subject that property to the bankruptcy estate, even though the trustee
technically holds legal title to the property pursuant to the deed of trust. Id. This Court has
described that legal title under a deed of trust as "nothing more than the power of sale upon
certain contingencies." Id. In fact, this Court said in Long that a trustor also holds "legal interest
in the property which [is] good against all persons except the [trustee,] which [holds] nothing
more than the power of sale upon certain contingencies." Id. To use a familiar metaphor of
property law, the trustee holds only one of many sticks in the bundle that comprises the total
ownership rights in a particular piece of property. If the remaining sticks held by the truster are
substantial enough to be subject to the bankruptcy system then they are certainly enough to be
subjugated to a mechanic's lien.
Furthermore, as a fiduciary owing duties to the beneficiary and the trust, the trustee may
only exercise control over the trust property in limited circumstances, the most common
circumstance being the default of the trustor. Thus, "even though title passes for the purpose of
the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage with power of sale." Id. at
587-588, 671 P.2d at 1050-1051. 1 From the well known treatise on property law, the trustee's
role in a deed of trust is described:
The trustee (designated by the lender in most states) holds a limited legal title to
the property for the purpose of enforcing the lender's security interest. In the
event the trustor/borrower defaults on the promissory note, the beneficiary/lender
will notify the trustee and instruct the trustee to foreclose. The trustee will then
initiate either a judicial foreclosure Gust as with a mortgage), or more often, the
trustee will hold a private auction sale of the property.

1 While ACI is critical of the phrase "mortgage with a power of sale," as being inaccurate and leading to confusion,
the Court in Long correctly recognized the very limited nature of the trustee's legal title, which the Court in
ParkWest failed to do.
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11-94 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Editions§ 94.02 (emphasis added). From this
description it is apparent that the trustee may only act when called upon by the beneficiary
following the trustor' s default.
In fact, this limited role of the trustee is built in to the deeds of trust in the instant case,
the Monument Heights Deed of Trust and the St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust. Each of these
trust deeds makes the trustees' power to enforce the terms of the deeds subject to the option and
request of the beneficiary, illustrating the limited role of the trustee in the instrument. In
essence, the trustee is nothing more than the beneficiary's agent. The requirement to name such
party in the filing of a mechanic's lien seems neither necessary nor prudent since the trustee
cannot act with respect to the property without the authorization of the beneficiary.
The Monument Heights Deed of Trust contains the following language evidencing the
limited powers of the trustees:
B. It is mutually agreed that:
3. . .. upon written request of Beneficia,y ... Trustee may: reconvey all or any part
of said property; consent to the making of any map or plat thereof; join in
granting any easement thereon, or join in any extension agreement or any
agreement subordinating the lien or charge thereof.
4.
Upon written request of Beneficiary ... Trustee shall reconvey, ,vithout
warranty, the property then held hereunder ...
6. . . .In the event of default Beneficiary shall execute or cause the Trustee to
execute a ,vritten notice of such default and of his election to cause to be sold the
herein described property. . . .
Monument Heights Deed of Trust R. page 68 (Instrument No. 2172582000, emphasis added).
The St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust contains almost identical language evidencing the limited
power and role of the trustee. See St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust, R. page 72 (Instrument No.
2035938000). Thus, not only is the trustee's power and role limited in general, the specific
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deeds at issue grant the power of the trustee to act to the beneficiary and the trustee can only act
at the beneficiary's request.
C.

Did the District Court Err in Granting Summary Judgment Based Upon
Park West Homes, L.L.C. v. Barnson, 294 P.3d 1125, (Idaho 2013), in That the
Facts of That Case are Distinguishable From the Facts of the Present Case?

In ParkWest Homes, a trustee's sale had occurred. In fact, it was the buyer who
intervened and argued that it took the property free and clear of the mechanic's lien. In the
present case there is nothing in the record to indicate a sale has occurred. The sale was formally
stayed until after the summary judgment. Without a sale of the encumbered property there is no
real question as to whose rights to the encumbered property prevail, because the trustees' interest
is merely a power of sale, subject to the superior rights of the beneficiary of the deed of trust and
subject to the lien rights of ACI.
In ParkWest the property encumbered by the mechanic's lien was foreclosed by First
American through a trustee's sale and then conveyed to Residential through a Trustee's deed.
ParkWest, 154 Idaho at 681,302 P.3d at 21. As a result of the trustee's sale, Residential

maintained that it took the property free and clear of Park West's lien. Id. Consequently, the
issue addressed by this Court was:
[W]hether a lienor seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien against property
encumbered by a deed of trust must name the trustee of the deed of trust within
the period of time required by statute to give effect to the mechanic's lien against
subsequent holders of legal title.

Id. at 682, 302 P .3d at 22 (emphasis added). This Court ultimately held:
[B]ecause a mechanic's lien is lost as to any interest in property not named in a
foreclosure action, we hold that a subsequent holder of legal title to property
encumbered by a deed of trust and a mechanic's lien, takes the property free and
clear of the mechanic's lien, where the lienor fails to name the trustee of the deed
of trust in an action to enforce the mechanic's lien within the period of time
required by statute.
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Id. at 685, 302 P.3d at 25 (emphasis added). Present in both the issue addressed by this Court
and this Court's holding, is the factual scenario of the lien being rendered lost and unenforceable
as to a subsequent purchaser of the encumbered property. However, in this case there is not a
subsequent purchaser, and therefore, the holding of ParkWest should not apply to this case.
Similarly, the holding does not apply to the facts of ACI's liens because there was no
"subsequent holder oflegal title to property" as in ParkWest because there has been no trustee's
sale, only appointment of successor trustees.
This importance of this distinction becomes clear when ACI' s remaining rights pursuant
to its mechanics lien are exercised. Assuming that the district court judge's determination that
ACI's lien is not lost and can be foreclosed but is subject to the trustees' interest under the deeds
of trust- merely a power to sell - then ACI forecloses under its mechanics lien, the property is
sold subject to the trustee's power to sell. Practically speaking, ACI will have priority over the
beneficiary and the grantor on the deed of trust so when the interest is sold at sheriffs sale and
ACI bids its judgment credit, ACI takes over the position of the grantor and beneficiary and
simply has the trustee reconvey the power of sale to ACI. This convoluted procedure could be
avoided by just the Court's recognizing that the trustee has nothing but a power of sale which is
dependent upon the grantor and beneficiary so that when a lien has priority over a deed of trust
through the grantor and the beneficiary, the named defendants, the lien has priority over the
trustee as well. This procedure is consistent with the reality that the trustee is nothing more than
the agent of the beneficiary for the purpose of sale. The statute speaks to conveyance, but the
conveyance is limited to the power of sale and it is controlled by the beneficiary. A foreclosure
of the interest of the beneficiary and the grantor is the foreclosure of the trustee's interest under
the deed of trust. ACI will be able to foreclose on its mechanic's lien just as if the judge
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determined that the mechanic's lien had priority to the interests of the trustees under the deed of
trust.
Necessary to this Court's decision in ParkWest was the equitable principle that a good
faith purchaser should prevail against the mistake of a seller or related party, and when title is in
dispute the title goes in favor of the good faith purchaser. \Vhile this concern was never
explicitly discussed by this Court, it seems apparent that it was an important factor. For instance,
the equitable considerations relating to bona fide purchasers are well established in property
law. 2 A bona fide purchaser is "one who has in good faith paid valuable consideration for
property without notice of prior adverse claims." Black's Law Dictionary 1355 (Bryan A.
Gamer ed., 9th ed., West 2009). Because of the good faith of the purchaser and equitable
considerations "generally, a bona fide purchaser for value is not affected by the transferor's fraud
against a third party and has a superior right to the transferred property." Id. Thus, the courts are
willing to determine title to property based on the good faith of the purchaser and equitable
principles.

D.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Construe the Idaho Lien Statutes, LC.
§ 45-501, et seq., Liberally in Favor of the Lien Holder Because the Lien
Holder Substantially Complied, in Good Faith, With the Statutory
Requirements For a Mechanic's Lien.

The district court erred in holding that ACI's mechanic's liens are lost and unenforceable
against the Monument Heights Deed of Trust and the St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust because
these liens were filed in good faith and in substantial compliance with LC. § 45-501, et seq., and

2

ACI is not arguing that Residential was a good faith purchaser, but is drawing a parallel between the equitable
treatment of bona fide purchasers and this Court's holding that Residential got free and clear title to the encumbered
property because the trustee was not named in the foreclosure action, which appears to have some equitable
reasoning.
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should therefore be construed liberally in favor of ACI. The statute governing the contents of a
materialman's lien requires the following:
(a) A statement of his demand, after deducting all just credits and offsets;
(b) The name of the owner, or reputed owner, if known;
(c) The name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished
the materials; and
(d) A description of the property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for
identification.
l.C. § 45-507(3). The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when considering a lien's
statutory compliance the statutes must be liberally construed in the lien holder's favor:

In considering a contention challenging the sufficiency of compliance with
statutory requisites, it should be kept in mind that a substantial compliance in
good faith meets such requirement; that the provisions of our lien statutes must be
liberally construed in favor of the claimant with a view to effect their object and
promote justice.
Layrite Prods. Co. v. Lux, 86 Idaho 477, 483-484, 388 P.2d 105, 109 (1964); see also Turnboo v.
Keele, 86 ldaho 101, 383 P.2d 591 (1963); Dybvig v. Willis, 59 Idaho 160, 82 P.2d 95 (1938),
Phillips v. Salmon River A1in. & Development Co., 9 Idaho 149, 72 P. 886 (1903).
The language of the mechanic lien statute's requirement of "[t]he name of the owner, or
reputed owner, if known" should be an indication that a hypertechnical standard is not required in
filing a mechanic's lien. I.C. § 45-507(3)(a) (emphasis added). For instance, when a mechanic's
lien was mistakenly filed against a lessee instead of the record ovmer of the property the Court
did not hold that mistake fatal. Gem State Lbr. Co. v. Union G. & E. Co., 47 Idaho 747, 749750, 278 P. 775, 776 (1929). In that case, the failure to name the record ov.ner of the property
was not fatal to the lien because the record ov.ner "was in no manner misled by the mistake, but
had been apprised of the lien claim and knew all about it long prior to the institution of the suit."

Id. at 749. Looking to the facts of that case, it is instructive that failure to name the sole party
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with title to the property did not render the lien lost or unenforceable. A lessee has absolutely no
legal claim to title in leased property, but naming a lessee as owner of encumbered property did
not cause the lien to be lost or unenforceable. In that case, the Court construed the requirements
of the statute liberally and in favor of the lien holder, validating the lien because of the
substantial compliance and good faith of the lien holder.
Similarly, years later the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of Gem State, when it
proclaimed:
This Court, in Gem State Lumber Co. v. Union Grain & Elevator Co., 4 7 Idaho
747, 278 P. 775, 776, upon invoking the rule of liberal construction of the lien
law, held that failure to state the name of the record owner of the property in the
claim of lien, was not fatal since it appeared that such owner "was in no manner
misled by the mistake, but had been apprised of the lien claim."

Manley v. MacFarland, 80 Idaho 312, 322-323, 327 P.2d 758, 764 (1958). The Idaho Supreme
Court has continually held that failure to name a particular party in a claim of mechanic's lien is
not fatal if the lien is filed in good.faith and the record owner is not misled by the mistake. In the

Manley case, the Court was asked to follow Willes v, Palmer, 78 Idaho 104,298 P.2d 972
(1956), which the current Supreme Court relied on for its holding in ParkWest, for the
proposition that a lien filed against only one owner of jointly held community property is invalid
because it fails to name all parties with title. Id. at 322, 327 P.2d at 764. The Manley Court
correctly refused to follow that interpretation of Willes and stated "[t]hat case does not support
[that] contention; though it involved a claim of lien naming only the husband as the owner or
reputed ovmer, this Court did not rule upon the validity of the claim." Id. Instead, the Manley
Court upheld a lien with only one marital partner named because the omission did not result in
any prejudice. Id. Thus, failure to name one party with an interest in property is excusable when
construing the statute liberally in the favor of the lien holder if the lien was filed in good faith
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and the omission does not result in any prejudice.
Lest the principle of liberal construction in the favor of the lien holder is forgotten, in a
similar case where a lien named only one of the reputed owners of community real property the
Court upheld the lien despite the complete failure to name the title holding party. Layrite Prods.
Co. v. Lux, 86 Idaho 477,483,388 P.2d 105, 108 (1964). Once again, the Court focused on

"substantial compliance in good faith" and not on technicalities. Id.
In this case, the statutory requirements were met in good faith with substantial
compliance in each lien. The failure to include the trustee should not be a basis for the failure of
the liens. If the complete omission of the sole record owner's name in the Gem State case was
not fatal to the lien, then the omission of only the trustees to a deed of trust in this case should
not be fatal either. ACI certainly complied with the statutory standard set forth in LC. § 45-507
requiring "[t]he name of the owner, or reputed owner, if known." Furthermore, there is no
surprise or prejudice to the unnamed parties in this case that would necessitate the failure of the
liens. Thus, when viewing the materialman's lien statute liberally and in favor of the lien holder,
ACI's materialman's liens substantially comply with the statutory requirements.
E.

Is the District Court's ruling on the Priority of ACI's Lien vis-a-vis the Trust
Deeds Unclear?

\Vhether the District Court decision applies only to the trustee or to the deed of trust as a
whole is of paramount importance. If the deed of trust has priority, then the mechanics lien is
not only junior it is essentially worthless, as it is highly unlikely that the property has any value
in excess of that debt secured by the deed of trust.
ACI filed a mechanic's lien for the services and the material provided to the project. The
trustee may have been conveyed a limited title as described by ParkWest, but as analyzed above
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the title appears to be nothing more than a power of sale or the reconveyance of the power to sell.
If the trustee remains but the beneficiary and the grantor are foreclosed, then the lien remains

worth foreclosing. ACI can purchase the beneficiary's position and terminate the trustee or
reconvey to the grantor so that that the judgments can be paid. To hold that the deed of trust has
priority is to say that the grantor and the beneficiary are protected even though they have
properly been sued.
As Ms. Saltman pointed out:
ParkWest next argued that even if it lost its lien as to the trustee, its judgment lien
against Ms. Bamson attached to her interest in the property prior to Residential's
purchase of the property at the trustee's sale. The Court made quick work of this
argument, explaining that the interest that Residential acquired from the trustee
dated back to the interest conveyed to the trustee under the deed of trust, as
opposed to the date of the sale. In doing so, the Court relied on Idaho Code
Section 45-1506(10), which states:
The trustee's deed shall convey to the purchaser the interest in the
property which the grantor had, or had the power lo convey. at the
time of the execution by him of the trust deed together with any
interest the grantor or his successors in interest acquired after the
execution of such trust deed.
Interestingly, this seemingly simple explanation exposed the problem with the
Court's previous "title theory" analysis under Idaho's deed of trust statutes. Under
Section 45-1506(10), the trustee under the deeds of trust conveyed to Residential
the interest that Ms. Bamson had, or bad the power to convey, at the time she
executed the MERS deeds of trust on November 14, 2006. However, the interest
that Ms. Bamson held on November 14, 2006 was subject to any mechanics' lien
rights of Park West relating back to its commencement of construction. If
ParkWest's lien attached to Ms. Bamson's interest in the property prior to
November 14, 2006, was deemed valid by ParkWest I, and was properly enforced
against Ms. Bamson's interest in the property, how was Residential ultimately
able to take better title than Ms. Barnson was ever able to convey to the trustee?
This quandary was not resolved by the Court in ParkWest II. In its briefing
on appeal, Residential argued that the foregoing interpretation of Section 451506( 10) reads out of existence the requirement that a lienor must enforce its lien
against a party-in-interest within six months of its claim of lien pursuant to
Section 45-510. Residential's argument relies, as it must, on the Court's agreement
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that the trustee is the legal title holder to the property (otherwise the interest lost
vis-a-vis the trustee would be negligible, as ParkWest believed). It is not the
mechanics' lien statute, but the Court's expansive view of the nature of title held
by the trustee -- and the complete loss of Park West's lien for failure to name that
trustee -- that creates the conflict Residential identifies. However, this reasoning
still ignores the fact that, in the end, the trustee only held and could only convey
to Residential the interest it received from Ms. Barnson -- an interest that was
subject to ParkWest's validly filed and properly enforced mechanic's lien.
Soltman, supra at 30.
Junior lien holders only get paid any remaining proceeds of the trustee's sale after the
sale expenses and the obligations secured by the trust deed are paid off, LC. § 45-1507,
essentially nothing in most cases. If the lien is merely lost and unenforceable as to the trustee's
limited power to sell (as the order was worded), then the lien is still superior to the Deeds of
Trust and the property at sale will remain encumbered by ACI's mechanic's lien. See 59A C.J.S.
Mortgages § 838.
The district court's summary judgment decision does not seem to hold that the deeds of
trust have priority over ACI' s lien. Such a holding appears to be consistent with the application
of Park West; however if that is not what the district court meant, then the decision should be
reversed as moving beyond the scope of Idaho law.
Jacobsen sought in the Motion for Summary Judgment Memorandum in Support, and at
the Hearing the following:
1. "Defendants ... move this Honorable Court for entry of summary judgment against
Plaintiff. .. holding that [ACI's] claims of [sic] are lost and unenforceable against the
deeds of trust recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder." Defendants· Motion for
Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff AC! Northwest, Inc., 2 (February 26, 2013); R.
page 43.
2. "Plaintiffs Notice of Claim of Lien ... is lost and unenforceable against each of
Defendants' deeds of trust." Memorandum in Support of Defendants ' Motion for
Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff AC! Northwest, Inc., 9 (February 26, 2013); R.
page 53.
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3. "[Defendants] requests entry of summary judgment against Plaintiff, ACI Northwest,
Inc., on the basis that its mechanic's liens are lost and unenforceable against the
Monument Heights Deed of Trust and St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust." Memorandum
in Support of Defendants· _Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff, ACI
Northwest, Inc., 9 (February 26, 2013); R. page 54.
4. "We request that summary judgment be entered and hold that ACI's lien is lost and
unenforceable against the title that the trustees' representative deeds of trust currently
hold." Transcript on Appeal, 11. 5 - 8, 14.
5. "Your Honor, we are not arguing that ACI's lien is destroyed by the ParkWest decision
by its failure to timely join the trustees. We are only arguing that its mechanic's lien loses
priority to the legal title that those trustee's hold. i\nd actually, the mechanic's lien is lost
and unenforceable as to legal title those two trustees currently hold .. .if they convert that
title be a deed ofreconveyance or a trustee's deed. Subsequently this can be free and
clear of ACI's mechanic's lien. That's all we are saying. ACI could still continue to
pursue its subordinate interest in the land if it chooses to do so, but that interest cannot be
senior to the title that the trustees currently hold pursuant to those deeds of trust."
Transcript on Appeal, 11. 11 - 24; 20.
The Memorandum Decision and Order states:
1. "In this action Third-Party Plaintiff, ACI Northwest, Inc. ("ACI") seeks a determination
that its claims are senior and take priority over Defendants' Deeds of Trust. Defendants
have brought this Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that ACI' s mechanic's lien
does not have priority because ACI failed to include necessary parties in the action,
namely the trustees of the Defendants' deeds of trust." Memorandum Decision and
Order, 2 (April 5, 2013); R. page 118.
2. "This Court finds that because ACI failed to join the trustees who hold legal title to the
Monument Heights property, as required by I.C. § 45-510 and as construed in the
Supreme Court ofldaho's recent holding in ParkWest, Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment." Memorandum Decision and Order, 9 - 10 (April 5, 2013); R. pages
125 - 126.
3. "This Court finds that pursuant to LC.§ 45-510 Plaintiff ACI was required to join the
trustees, the holders of legal title, in its action to judicially foreclose its mechanics liens;
as a result of ACI's failure to join the hotders of legal title, the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is GR.ANTED." Memorandum Decision and Order, 10 (April 5,
2013); R. page 126.
4. Later the Court, in its Partial Summary Judgment Against ACI said "Plaintiffs Claim of
Lien recorded on January 29, 2009 with the Kootenai County Recorder as Instrument No.
2194504000, is lost and unenforceable against the legal title held by the trustee under the
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Deed of Trust recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder on August 6, 2008 as
Instrument 2172582000." Partial Summary Judgment Against ACI, 2 (April 17, 2013); RI
page 192.
In the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of
Trustee's Sale the court states:

1. "ACI' s liens were lost and unenforceable against the legal title because ACI did not join
the trustees who held legal title in its action to judicially foreclose its mechanic's lien."
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of
Trustee's Sale, 4 (June 13, 2013); Record page 230.

2. "In April 2013 the Court determined that ACI's mechanic's liens were lost and
unenforceable against the legal title of the subject property because ACI failed to join the
trustees who hold legal title, so ACI's priority was lost." Memorandum Decision and
Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of Trustee's Sale, 5 (June 13, 2013);
R. page 231.
The district court's decision is confusing because it attempts to follow a confusing and
erroneous view of deeds of trust. This Court has the ability to clean up the mess and should
overrule Long, Defendant A., and ParkWest and start fresh with the statute and the interpretation
of each respective deed of trust. The deed of trust is used in almost every home loan in Idaho
and is of such importance that the concept of a deed of trust should be judicially treated as a deed
of trust, not a mortgage, not a deed, and not a trust. It conveys a right to sell real property that
secures a debt and nothing more.
F.

Application of the Park West Holding to This Case (the Idea That a
Subsequent Transfer of the Property Pursuant to the Trust Instrument Will
Result in the Transferee Taking the Property Free and Clear of ACI's Lien)
Is at Odds With General Rules of Trust Law and Idaho Statute Because
ACl's Mechanics Lien is Superior to the Deeds of Trust as Intruments.

The general rule of a trustee's sale is that
the purchaser at a foreclosure sale ... takes subject to valid and operative liens and
encumbrances which have priority over the mortgage or deed of trust under which
the foreclosure sale is made [and] [e]xcept under special circumstances, the
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purchaser at a foreclosure sale under a ... deed of trust takes subject to liens and
encumbrances which are prior in rank to such ... deed."
59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 838. Idaho statutes do not vary from this general rule and implicitly
supports it. For instance, LC. § 45-1507 outlines the priority order of payment to be made out of
the proceeds of a trustee's sale, beginning with expenses of the sale, then the obligation secured
by the trust deed, then any junior liens, followed by the grantor of the trust. Idaho statute does
not conflict with the proposition that property sold at trustee's sale remains encumbered by a lien
senior to the deed of trust.
Indeed, this is the same conclusion dravm below by the District Court where it concluded
that a trustee's sale of the property encumbered by ACI's lien cannot "negatively impact ACI."
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of the Trustee's
Sale, 6 (June 13, 2013); R. page 232.
This argument comes from the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants'
Motion to Vacate Stay of the Trustee's Sale, 6 (June 13, 2013); R. page 232. The Defendants'
argument, adopted by the court, is that a trustee's sale of the property will not affect ACI's
interests in the property, whatever they may tum out to be. The judge agreed and stated: "If, on
appeal, the Court finds that ACI holds senior priority, then ACI will have a valid and operative
lien against the subject property ... On the other hand, if on appeal, the Court finds [the J ACI lien
is junior, then ACI's position will remain the same as it is today." Id. The judge's conclusion
was based on 59A C.J.S. Mortgages§ 838 and Idaho Code§§ 45-1507 and 1508.
However, this is not true if ParkWest is followed for the following reason: Today (any
day before a trustee's sale), according to the Memorandum Decision and Order, ACI may have
senior claim to the property encumbered by its mechanics lien against all interests, except the
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power of sale held by the trustees under the deed of trust. Tomorrow (anytime after a trustee's
sale pursuant to the deed of trust) ACI's lien will have no priority over the land currently
encumbered under its mechanic's lien. This is so because ParkWest held "that a subsequent
holder of legal title to property encumbered by a deed of trust and a mechanic's lien, takes the
property fi·ee and clear of the mechanic's lien, where the lienor fails to name the trustee of the

deed of trust in an action to enforce the mechanic's lien within the period of time required by
statute." ParkWest, 154 Idaho at 685,302 P.3d at 25 (emphasis added). That means that before
a trustee's sale, ACI can foreclose on the interests of the beneficiaries of the deed of trust
pursuant to its mechanic's lien, but after a trustee's sale ACI's mechanic's lien has no claim to
the new purchaser's ownership in the property. This does not sound like a result that "will not
negatively impact ACI" and ensure that "ACI's position will remain the same as it is today."
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Vacate Stay of the Trustee's
Sale, 6 (June 13, 2013); R. page 232.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, ACI respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district
court's grant of summary judgment below, and award ACI its attorney's fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 45-513.
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